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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

Stephen Burgess,
-~

Petitioner,
Appeal No: 20150170

V.

Utah Career Service Review Office
and Utah Department of
Corrections,
Respondents.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This court has jurisdiction to review the final agency action of the
Career Service Review Office pursuant to Utah Code§ 78A-4-103(2)(a)(i)(A).

ISSUE PRESENTED
CSRO's decision was reasonable and rational

Burgess's employment was terminated for off-duty misconduct that,
when coupled with his failure to adequately take responsibility for and
understand the seriousness of his misconduct, caused the agency director to
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lose confidence in Burgess's ability to safely supervise inmate construction
crews working outside the prison. The CSRO found that substantial evidence
supported the agency's decision and concluded that the agency had not
abused its discretion, particularly in light of how the agency director was
actively implementing a charge from the governor to restore the public's trust
in the agency. Is the CSRO's decision within the bounds of reasonableness
and rationality?

Standard of review:
This Court reviews "an agency's application of its own rules for
reasonableness and rationality, according the agency some, but not total
deference." Lunnen v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 886 P.2d 70, 72 (Utah Ct. App.
1994) (citing Kent v. Dep't of Employment Sec., 860 P.2d 984, 986 (Utah App.
1993).
Burgess stipulates that this standard of review governs "all issues
raised in this appeal." Aplt. Brf. at 5.

Preservation:
In both its initial decision and its subsequent decision denying
reconsideration, the CSRO found that substantial evidence supported the
2
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Agency's determination that discipline was warranted and concluded that the
Agency had acted within the bounds of its discretion in the discipline it
imposed. R. 418-47, 490-495.

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Admin. R. 137-1-21(3):

(3) Evidentiary/Step 4 Hearing. An evidentiary/step 4 hearing shall be a
hearing on the record according to Subsections 67-19a-406(1) and (2), held de
nova, with both parties being granted full administrative process as follows:
(a) The CSRO hearing officer shall first make factual findings
based solely on the evidence presented at the hearing without
deference to any prior factual findings of the agency. The CSRO
hearing officer shall then determine whether:
(i) the factual findings made from the evidentiary/step 4
hearing support with substantial evidence the allegations made
by the agency or the appointing authority, and
(ii) the agency has correctly applied relevant policies,
rules, and statutes.
(b) When the CSRO hearing officer determines in accordance
with the procedures set forth above that the evidentiary/step 4 factual
findings support the allegations of the agency or the appointing
authority, then the CSRO hearing officer must determine whether the
agency's decision, including any disciplinary sanctions imposed, is
excessive, disproportionate or otherwise constitutes an abuse of
discretion. In making this latter determination, the CSRO hearing
officer shall give deference to the decision of the agency or the
appointing authority. If the CSRO hearing officer determines that the
agency's penalty is excessive, disproportionate or constitutes an abuse
of discretion, the CSRO hearing officer shall determine the appropriate
remedy.

3
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the case:
Stephen Burgess appeals the decision of the Career Service Review
Board (CSRO) affirming the termination of his employment with the Utah
Department of Corrections. The CSRO determined that substantial evidence
supported the allegations of misconduct and that the Department did not
abuse its discretion in imposing termination. The issue before this Court is
whether the CSRO acted reasonably and rationally in affirming the
termination of Burgess's employment.
Burgess was fired for off-duty misconduct. Airport police were
concerned that Burgess and his two traveling companions were too drunk to
drive, so they intervened and helped Burgess and his traveling companions
get into taxi cab instead of driving home. But moments after the police left,
Burgess and the others got out of the cab and into a vehicle belonging to one
of the traveling companions. Airport police quickly intercepted the men
again before they left the parking lot. The friend who was driving had a
blood alcohol level of .097 and he was arrested for DUI. Burgess was
arrested for public intoxication, based on the officers' assessment that

4
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Burgess was a danger to himself for leaving a vehicle with a sober driver and
~

getting into a vehicle with a driver who had been drinking.
This incident - coupled with Burgess's failure to adequately justify or
take responsibility for his decision to get out of the cab - caused the head of
Corrections, Director Rollin Cook, to question Burgess's judgment and lose
confidence in Burgess's ability to adequately perform his job, particularly in
light of Director Cook's efforts to increase departmental accountability for
misconduct. This increase in accountability was part of a plan Director Cook

¾:I

was implementing to meet the governor's charge to improve the culture of the
department and restore the public's trust in the department. Critical to the
director's decision was that Burgess did not seem to recognize the seriousness
of his misconduct and defended his misconduct solely on blind trust in a
friend, at the expense of disregarding the police intervention.

Course of proceedings:
Burgess appealed his termination to the CSRO. A two-day trial was
held. R. 594-95. The CSRO affirmed Burgess's decision. R. 418-47. Burgess
filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CSRO denied. R. 490-95. This
appeal followed.

5
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Disposition below:
On January 13, 2015, the CSRO affirmed the Department's decision to
terminate Burgess's empioyment. R. 418-47. The CSRO found that
substantial evidence did not support the charge of public intoxication but
affirmed all other aspects of the termination. R. 432. It also concluded that
termination was not an abuse of the Department's discretion. R. 445-4 7. On
February 12, 2015, the CSRO denied Burgess' amended motion for
reconsideration, elaborating on and supplementing the findings and
conclusions of its January 13 decision. R. 490-495 (attached in the
addendum). Among other things, the CSRO found that Burgess's misconduct
"violated policy" (R. 492); it also clarified that only the public intoxication
basis was set aside, and nothing more, and gave some non-exhaustive
examples of how Burgess's misconduct violated other policies cited in the
Notice of Intent. R. 493-94.

6
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
~

Governor's mandate to fix problems in the agency

Director Rollin Cook is the executive director of the Utah Department
of Corrections. Tr. 318. 1 Prior to this, Director Cook had worked for nearly
twenty-three years in the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office, the last four or
five years of which he had management and leadership responsibilities
similar to his current responsibilities. Tr. 318-19.
Governor Herbert appointed Director Cook as the head of corrections in
¼J

2013. Tr. 318. In two interviews before the appointment, Governor Herbert
outlined what he expected of Cook if he were selected for the job: to change
the "significant cultural problems within the organization," thereby
improving the morale and culture of the department and restoring the
public's trust in the department. Tr. 319-20. These long-time problems had
culminated when the "previous department administration had been removed
by a vote of no confidence from the employer organizations and the
employees" in the department. Tr. 320. The department likewise "didn't

...;;)

1 The

covers of the two volumes of the trial transcript are respectively marked as
pages 594 and 595 of the record. Citations to the transcript will be to the
transcript's native pagination. Volume 1 consists of pages Tr. 1-271. Volume 2
consists of pages Tr. 272-600.

7
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have a great reputation" among sister law enforcement and corrections
agencies. Tr. 320.

Expectations of a higher standard of conduct
From day one as head of the agency, Director Cook observed that a lack
of accountability for employee misconduct had contributed significantly to the
agency's problems under past administrations. Tr. 322. He learned that,
under past administrations, misconduct had generally been met with
relatively light discipline and "the disciplinary history of the organization has
not been very good." Tr. 322, 360.

Director Cook prepared a plan for

improving the agency's problems that included, among other things,
increasing accountability for misconduct by holding employees to a higher
standard of conduct than they had in the past. Tr. 322-31. He shared his
plan and expectations throughout the organization, including holding
multiple meetings with employees that included question-and-answer
portions and in-depth Powerpoint presentations. Tr. 331. He made it "clear
to the employees" that he was "going to hold them to a higher
standard than
--

they'd been held to in the past." Id. This and other improvements were
stressed continuously in staff meetings and in weekly messages Director
Cook sent out to all employees. Tr. 332. Despite the enormity of the needed
8
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I~

changes, Director Cook described his efforts as "persistent" and "determined."
r.j

Tr. 334. Director Cook described the core function of the department as going
beyond keeping the community safe and providing a safe and secure
environment for inmates, but also to be a "good partner in the community."

Id.

Burgess

Burgess began working for the Department in 2008. Tr. 508. At the
~

time of termination, his job was to supervise inmate construction crews
working outside the prison. Tr. 508-09.

Airport police intervene

The off-duty misconduct giving rise to Burgess's termination occurred
on December 14, 2013, at the Salt Lake International Airport. Burgess had
just arrived from an out-of-state trip, when an airport police officer noticed
that Burgess and two traveling companions appeared intoxicated to one
degree or another. Tr. 31-32, 34. The officer "frequently" dealt with
intoxicated people at the airport, knew the telltale signs of intoxication, and
had been trained in conducting field sobriety tests. Tr. 32-33, 39. None of
the three looked sober enough to drive. Tr. 35. Both of the traveling
9
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companions, Clint Fredrickson and Chris Surnrners - not Summers alone were "being loud and boisterous" in the airport terminal. Tr. 32. And "both
appeared to be stumbling or hanging on to each other." Tr. 32. Burgess
''wasn't stumbling nearly as bad" as the other two, but "looked a little
intoxicated" with a "glassed over" look. Tr. 34. The men smelled of alcohol.

Id.
Since 11:00 am that morning, Burgess had consumed six alcoholic
drinks - two hard liquor drinks and the "equivalent of about two quarts of
beer." Tr. 557. Burgess had observed Fredrickson consuming alcohol
through the day, having seen him drink at least two margaritas and sixteen
ounces of beer. Tr. 520.
The three men boarded a shuttle bus to the economy parking lot. Tr.
34. The officer became concerned about possible drunk driving "because
there's really no reason to go to the economy lot unless you have a car there
and I didn't see them with anyone else who appeared to be sober to drive
them." 'l'r. 34-35. He radioed a fellow officer who was out on vehicle patrol
that the "[t]hree individuals look like they might be intoxicated" and w~_re
headed to the economy parking lot. Tr. 35. He asked the patrol officer to
"check and make sure they don't drive." Tr. 35.

10
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•

Officer Nathan Stowell received the call, and heard the first officer
~

report that there were "three possibly intoxicated males." Tr. 45. He also
had been trained in how to detect intoxication. Tr. 58-59. He and other
officers intercept the men as they got off the shuttle bus. Tr. 45, 484. Both
Fredrickson and Burgess testified that this encounter with the police was
intimidating. Fredrickson said "we were absolutely surrounded by airport
police ... from every direction" and "they were just up in our faces, it was
pretty intimidating. I was embarrassed, I was mad, I was scared of being in

<I'

trouble." Tr. 484. Burgess testified that he was shocked, surprised, and
intimidated by the police's sudden appearance. Tr. 527.
Police talked with the men for a few minutes. Summers lied to police
that someone was coming to pick them up. Tr. 47, 528. Burgess initially
tried to correct Summer's lies, but after thirty seconds to a minute he "took a
few steps away" and talked individually with one of the officers. Tr. 528.
Burgess told that officer that the men did not, in fact, have someone to drive

-4iJ

them home. Tr. 47. Fredrickson - "saying whatever I needed to get out of
that situation" - insisted that they had a ride home. Tr. 485-86. Fredrickson
said in the "group conversation" that "[i]t's probably not a good idea for us to
be driving"; although Burgess was never more than a few steps away, he

11
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testified that he never heard Fredrickson say this. Tr. 486, 499 (emphasis
added).
After talking with the three men, Officer StoweH believed that
Summers should not be driving. Tr. 47. As to Burgess and Fredrickson, they
both had "had red eyes, glossy eyes." Tr. 46. They each smelled individually
of alcohol. Tr. 66, 73. Officer Stowell would not have let either of them drive
without investigating further to "determine a level of intoxication beyond
odor of alcohol." Tr. 46-4 7, 62. He did not investigate further, because
neither insisted on driving. Tr. 72. At trial, Officer Stowell testified that he
would not have felt comfortable with a person driving ..who had consumed the
amount of alcohol in the time period Burgess had; he considered that to be a
"significant amount of alcohol consumption during that day." Tr. 74.

The Taxi Cab
The officers called a cab; when it arrived, they suggested the men - all
three of them - ride home in the cab. Tr. 47, 528. Whether by acquiescence
or express agreement, all three men agreed to take the cab home. Tr. 47 ("I
suggested a cab and they agreed on that.") (emphasis added). Fredrickson
expressly agreed. Tr. 47. Burgess did not object. Tr. 529. The officers did
not order any of the men to get into the cab. Tr. 486, 529. All three
12
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voluntarily got into the cab. Tr. 486.
vi

With the men safely in the cab, the

officers cleared the call and left, thinking the matter had been resolved. Tr.
48.
But moments after police left, the men got out of the cab and into
Fredrickson's truck. Tr. 486-87. Fredrickson testified that he had never
intended on taking the cab home, but had intentionally misled police into
thinking he did, so they would leave him alone. Tr. 498-99. Fredrickson was
planning on going hunting the next morning and did not relish the thought of
a two-hour round-trip drive to retrieve his truck. Tr. 487-88, 506. But he
also testified that if Burgess had simply encouraged him to stay in the cab, he
would have. Tr. 505. Burgess admitted that he knew of Fredrickson's
hunting trip and desire to drive home to avoid the inconvenience of coming
back to pick up the truck. Tr. 555.
At trial, when Burgess was asked if it ever crossed his mind, while in
the cab, "that it might not be a good idea to get out of the cab." He replied,

4

"That's not an easy yes or no answer." Tr. 553. Burgess said he chose to get
out of the cab based solely on Fredrickson's statement that he was sober
enough to drive, even though Burgess understood that "there was some risk"
in getting out of the cab. Tr. 554-55. When asked why he did not mention
this risk to the others, or encourage them to stay in the cab, he replied:

13
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"That's where, again, looking in hindsight, there's just not a good answer for
that." Tr. 555. All of these answers were consistent with several earlier
statements he had made that he "didn't have a good explanation in
hindsight" for getting out of the cab and into Fredrickson's truck. Tr. 558.

The arrest

The officers were quickly notified that the cab had reached the parking
lot exit without any passengers. Tr. 49, 79. The officers stopped the truck
before it left the parking lot and began a DUI investigation. Tr. 50, 79-80.
Officer Stowell was frustrated that the men had left the cab. Tr. 57-58. He
thought that a reasonable "[n]o harm, no foul" solution had been reached that
would have ensured the men got home safely with a sober driver. Id.
Burgess was arrested for public intoxication, after officers concluded
that Burgess was a "danger to himself' by "removing himself from a vehicle
that was driven by a sober driver (taxi cab) and boarding a vehicle driven by
a possible intoxicated driver.n Tr. 53-54. This conclusion was not generalized
to all three suspects, but was made "particularly with regard to Mr. Burgess
[because] he had gotten out of the taxi cab and gotten into a vehicle that was
driven by someone who had been drinking and was possibly intoxicated." Id.
(emphasis added). No field sobriety tests were conducted on Burgess because
14
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l.

he had not insisted on driving and had "agreed to go with the cab." Tr. 72.
"

As Officer Stowell handcuffed Burgess, he noticed an odor of alcohol. Tr. 50.
He again noticed Burgess's red eyes, as another sign of possible intoxication.
Tr. 51.
Fredrickson's blood alcohol level was ultimately measured at .097, more
than twenty percent higher than the legal limit. Tr. 93-94. He was arrested

~

for DUI. Tr. 95. One officer noticed, that in addition to the odor of alcohol
and red, glossy eyes, Fredrickson's speech was slurred. Tr. 91. The officer
~

testified that, even without knowing Fredrickson's blood alcohol level, he
would not have ridden in a vehicle driven by Fredrickson - "the alcohol smell,
the eyes, and his slurred speech alone would motivate me not to get into the
vehicle with him." Tr. 95.

Department investigation
Two days after the arrest, on December 16, 2015, Burgess self-reported
the public intoxication arrest to his immediate supervisor. R. 587. However,
he made no mention of getting out of the cab in defiance of police
intervention, or that the driver of the truck he got into was charged with
DUI. R. 587; Tr. 129, 538. Instead, his report inaccurately suggested that
his arrest had come during the initial encounter after disembarking from the
15
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shuttle bus: "They got on the shuttle to go to their vehicles and at some point
were stopped by the cops, taken off the shuttle and arrested." R. 587.
An internal investigation was opened. Burgess told the internal
investigator that he simply trusted Frerickson's assertion that he was sober
enough to drive; however, Burgess did "not have a good answer for why he got
out of a taxi, with a sober driver, [and] into a truck with a driver who had
been drinking." Tr. 138, R. 548, 552-53. The investigator ultimately
determined that Burgess had violated two Department policies - AE 02/07
and AE 02/11. These policies provide, in part:

Utah Department of Corrections Policy AE 02/07
It is the policy of the Department that members conduct
themselves lawfully and honestly, both on and off duty.
Because members of the Department are part of the state's
criminal justice system and are accountable by the citizens for
their conduct, their actions and conduct are legitimately held to a
higher standard.
Dishonest and/or unlawful behavior of members has the potential
to undermine public confidence and trust in the Department and
its ability to carry out its mission.
Members shall not engage in any act, conduct or omission that
violates federal, state, local law or administrative rule, nor shall
they aid, abet, or encourage others to do so.

Utah Department of Corrections Policy AE 02/11
No member shall act or behave privately or officially in such a
manner that undermines the efficiency of the Department, ca uses
16
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the public to lose confidence in the Department, or brings
discredit upon himself/herself, the State of Utah, or the
Department.
R. 544-49. The investigator based his conclusions on the following:
--Burgess acknowledged he had been drinking alcohol earlier in
the day.
--Burgess admitted exiting the taxi and leaving the parking lot as
a passenger in Fredrickson's vehicle. Burgess said he does not
have a good answer for why he decided to get out of the taxi and
enter into Fredrickson's truck.
--The Airport Police report states Burgess was arrested for
intoxication as he created a risk to himself by exiting a car with a
sober driver (taxi cab) to get into a car with a possibly intoxicated
driver (Fredrickson's truck).
--The police report states Burgess smelled of alcohol and had red
and glossy eyes
--Burgess has been charged with Intoxication, a Class C
Misdemeanor in Salt Lake City Justice Court (case #141400305).
His arraignment has been set for February 11, 2014.
R. 549.

Director Cook's decision to terminate
On February 7, 2014, Burgess received a notice of "Intent to Discipline
lllJ)

-

Dismissal" from his division director, recommending that Director Cook

terminate Burgess's employment. R. 550-51. This notice identified Burgess's
misconduct at the airport as the basis of the recommendation, including
Burgess's leaving the cab and getting into Fredrickson's truck despite the
intervention of airport police. Id. It also cited the same policy provisions set
17
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forth above, as well as Utah Admin. R. 477-9, which states, in part:
"Employees shall comply with the standards of conduct established in these
rules and the policies and rules estabiished by agency management."
On February 14, 2014, Burgess wrote an email to Director Cook, asking
for lesser discipline. R. 552-53. He stated: "I know my actions that night
ultimately were the wrong ones. I made a very big mistake by getting out of
the cab with the other two passengers." R. 552. He further stated: "I was a
follower rather than a leader." Id. Regarding getting out of the cab, he said:
"Clint [Fredrickson] was in a situation that he needed his vehicle, he felt he
was ok to drive, and I, very wrongly, went along with it. I had reached the
point that I just wanted to get home." Id. Burgess also noted that he "could
not argue with what the police said they saw or smelled, bottom line is that I
had been drinking." Id.
On February 26, 2015, Burgess met with Director Cook. R. 554-55.
Burgess admitted that "he exercised poor judgment." Tr. 353.

When asked

why he got out of the cab, he started telling about how he thought
Fredrickson was not drunk. Director Cook asked Burgess to leave
Fredrickson out of his excuses, to which Burgess said, "I don't have a good
answer, then." Tr. 546, 552-53. Although Burgess now suggests that
Director Cook's interjection derailed his answer; he admitted at trial that he
18
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said the same thing in the internal investigation when no one was telling him
to leave Fredrickson out of his excuses. Tr. 552-53.
Director Cook described his decision on how much discipline to impose
as a "difficult decision to make" and "very draining" personally. Tr. 352, 354,
355. A decision that adversely affects someone's life is difficult to make, he
testified, "but you have to make it based on what's good for the organization,
what's good for the people of the State of Utah." Tr. 354. Director Cook had
been making termination decisions like this one for approximately ten years.
Tr. 360
Based on his meeting with Burgess, his review of Burgess's file, and his
review of Burgess's February 14 letter, Director Cook perceived that Burgess
had not taken responsibility for his misconduct and was "always blaming it
away or acting as if it's not a serious offense" and "not necessarily
understanding the significance of what occurred." Tr. 344, 352. Director
Cook believed that this was a "serious enough offense to be considered for
termination." Tr. 344. He further believed that imposing anything less than
termination would be a step backward into the very culture he had been
charged by the governor to eliminate. Tr. 344.
"More than one thing" led Director Cook to consider termination. On
basis was the public intoxication. Tr. 345. A separate basis was Burgess's
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decision to get out of the cab and get into a car with Fredrickson behind the
wheel, despite having "caught a break" by being allowed to ride home safely
in the cab. Tr. 345. Director Cook testified:
This decision wasn't just based on his public intox[ication]
charge, it was based on his poor judgment. So it was a
combination of the public intoxication, sure, that booking, but it
was also about the decision, one to get out of a taxi cab when
you're going home, if you're cold and you're tired and so on. And
then choosing not only to get out of the cab, but then get into a
vehicle with someone who's intoxicated. (Tr. 361.) (Emphasis
added.)
As a law enforcement and corrections officer, that is just
unacceptable. How can the public trust us to deal with situations
like that when the people that have these types of problems when we do them? We can't. (Tr. 346.)
The decision of being intoxicated in public, the decision to get out
of a cab, the decision to drive with someone who's intoxicated, the
poor judgment shown throughout the entire process, the lack of
ownership, the lack of seeing that it's serious, all of those things,
including things of what's happened in previous disciplines, other
things I've been responsible for in deciding discipline. All of
those different things are important when I make the decision.
(Tr. 369-70.) (Emphasis added.)
Director Cook did not find any of Burgess's explanations to be mitigating
circumstances. Tr. 350.
After meeting with B1.irgess, Director Cook no longer trusted ·Burgess to
adequately perform his job. Tr. 347, 355. Director Cook was concerned that
Burgess would again demonstrate poor judgment in the future, and the risk
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L

that this might happen while on duty: 'Tm worried his judgment is going to
~

be impaired when he's managing felons in the community." Tr. 355. Director
Cook testified that a sworn public safety officer is expected to have "a whole
different level of trust there that goes towards the whole community" and
that public has a much higher expectation of what to expect from a
corrections officer who is managing inmates out in the community. Tr. Tr.
356, 359.
At the time Director Cook made his decision, the public intoxication
charge and the POST investigation were both still pending. The criminal
case was later dismissed without prejudice, but not until after Director Cook
had made his decision. Tr. 534, 557, 589. POST later declined to impose
sanctions. R. 590. All Director Cook knew at the time he made his decision
was that both matters were still pending.
At trial, Burgess agreed that his conduct warranted discipline and
disagreed only with the severity of the discipline:

Q. So you now recognize that trusting Clint that night was a
mistake?
A. I think I've always recognized that.

Q. Okay. Do you believe that for what happened you deserve to
be disciplined?
A. I've said that a few times, yes.
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Q. You just don't disagree with the discipline itself?
A.No.
Tr. 562.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The CSRO reasonably and rationally upheld the Department's decision
to terminate Burgess's employment.
The actual events that occurred at the airport are largely undisputed.
Airport police were concerned enough about possible drunk driving that they
intervened, which intervention culminated with all three men getting into a
cab. Moments later, in complete disregard or outright defiance of this
significant police intervention, Burgess got out of the cab. He then got into
Fredrickson's truck. He did not encourage Fredrickson to stay in the cab or
to not drive. This misconduct, when coupled with his failure to adequately
take responsibility for and understand the seriousness of his misconduct,
caused Director Cook to lose confidence in Burgess's ability to safely
supervise inmate construction crews working outside the prison.
The CSRO reasonably found that substantial evidence supported the
agency's decision and reasonably concluded that the agency had not abused
22
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its discretion, particularly in light of how the agency director was actively
implementing a charge from the governor to restore the public's trust in the
agency.

ARGUMENT
Standard of review

The CSRO's decision should be affirmed because it is reasonable and
rational. This Court reviews "an agency's application of its own rules for
reasonableness and rationality, according the agency some, but not total
deference." Lunnen v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 886 P.2d 70, 72 (Utah Ct. App.
1994) (citing Kent v. Dep't of Employment Sec., 860 P.2d 984, 986 (Utah App.
1993)). Burgess stipulates that this standard of review governs "all issues
raised in this appeal." Aplt Brf. 5.
This deferential standard of review is applied where the CSRO
determines a mixed question of law and fact that "is the type of decision 'in
which the [CSRO's] special expertise puts it in a better position than an
appellate court to evaluate the circumstances of the case in light of the
[CSRO's] mission."' Sorge v. Office of Atty. Gen., 2006 UT App 2,

,r 2,

128

P.3d 566 (quoting Utah Dep't of Corr. v. Despain, 824 P .2d 439, 443 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991)). This "is the type of decision that involves discretion" and is
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reviewed "to ensure it falls within the bounds of reasonableness and
rationality." Murray v. Utah Labor Comm'n, 2013 UT 38,

,r 30,

308 P.3d 461.

The CSRO "abuses its discretion only when it reaches an outcome 'that is
clearly against the logic and effect of such facts as are presented in support of
the application, or against the reasonable and probable deductions to be
drawn from the facts disclosed upon the hearing."' Sorge v. Office of Atty.

Gen., 2006 UT App 2,

,r 22,

128 P.3d 566 (quoting Tolman v. Salt Lake Cty.

Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 26 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)).
This standard is not a correctness standard: "Reasonableness ... is
essentially a test for logic and completeness rather than the correctness of the
decision." Murray v. Utah Labor Comm'n, 2013 UT 38,

,r 32,

308 P.3d 461

(emphasis added). "[A] discretionary decision involves a question with a
range of 'acceptable' answers, some better than others, and the agency or
trial court is free to choose from among this range without regard to what an
appellate court thinks is the 'best' answer." Id. at

,r 30; see also Tolman,

818
-

I.,..

P.2d 23, 26 (quoting R. Aldisert, The Judicial Process 759 (1976)) ("Discretion
__ '~!1--~~-111.pa~ses the power of cl:ioice among several courses of actic~m, _~~ch~of
which is considered permissible."').
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403( 4) governs judicial review of final agency
actions like this one that result from "formal adjudicative proceedings." It
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allows an appellate court to "grant relief only if ... it determines that a
person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced" by certain
agency actions. Id. Although Burgess does not cite to a specific subsection,
his arguments appear to invoke subsections 403(4)(g) & 403(4)(h)(i):
(4) The appellate court.shall grant relief only if, on the basis of
the agency's record, it determines that the person seeking judicial
review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the following:
(g) the agency action is based on a determination of fact,
made or implied by the agency, that is not support~d by
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole
record before the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of discretion delegated to the agency by
statute.
Utah Code Ann.§ 63G-4-403(4)(g) and (h)(i).

The CSRO's limited review
The CSRO's "authority to review departmental disciplinary actions is

limited to determining if there is factual support of the charges and, if so,
vs>

whether the sanction is so disproportionate to the charges that it 'amounts to
an abuse of discretion."' Lunnen v. Utah Dep't. of Transp., 886 P.2d 70, 72
(Utah Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Utah Dep't of Corr. v. Despain, 824 P.2d 439,
443 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)) (emphasis added). These limits are set forth in
Utah Admin. R. 137-1-21.
25
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Burgess challenges the CSRO's application of this rule to the facts
before it. Aplt. Brf. 5. Under the rule, the CSRO "shall first make factual
findings based solely on the evidence presented at the hearing without
deference to any prior factual findings of the agency." Utah Admin. R. 137-121(3)(a). The CSRO then determines whether these findings "support with
substantial evidence the allegations made by the agency" and whether the
"agency has correctly applied relevant policies, rules, and statutes." Utah
Admin. R. 137-1-21(3)(a)(i) & (ii).
Upon finding factual support for the agency's allegations, the CSRO
must then "determine whether the agency's decision, including any
disciplinary sanctions imposed, is excessive, disproportionate or otherwise
constitutes an abuse of discretion." Utah Admin. R. 137-1-21(3)(b). In
making this determination, the CSRO "shall give deference to the decision of
the agency." Id.

Substantial evidence supports the CSR0 1s factual findings
The CSRO's factual findings are supported by substantial evidence and
--

•--

-

--

-

•

--•---

--•--

------

should be affirmed. "An administrative law decision meets the substantial
evidence test when a reasonable mind might accept as adequate the evidence
supporting the decision." Oliver v. Labor Comm'n, 2015 UT App 225,
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Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

,r 8,

794

Utah Adv. Rep. 62, --- P.3d. --- (citation omitted). Substantial evidence is
"more than a scintilla of evidence, though less than the weight of the
evidence." Commercial Carriers v. Indus. Comm'n of Utah, 888 P.2d 707, 711
(Utah Ct. App. 1994) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Although much of Burgess's arguments focus on what his subjective
intentions were in getting out of the cab, he has not shown that the CSRO's
findings, when considered with the totality of the evidence, are outside the
range of reasonable and rational inferences that CSRO could have reasonably
drawn from the evidence presented at trial. The test is whether "a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate the evidence supporting the
decision," not whether some of the evidence would have supported a different
result. Oliver v. Labor Comm'n, 2015 UT App 225,

if 8.

His factual challenge states a preference for evidence to which he
wishes the CSRO had given more weight without showing that the CSRO
unreasonably gave more weight to conflicting evidence. At best, he presents
some inferences that the CSRO arguably could have made within the range of
reasonableness, if it had, in its discretion, given more weight to some
evidence and less weight to other evidence. But this Court cannot improperly
substitute its judgment between conflicting inferences that the CRSO might
have been drawn from the evidence. It is the provision of the CSRO, "not
27
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appellate courts, to resolve conflicting evidence, and where inconsistent
inferences can be drawn from the same evidence, it is for the [CSRO] to draw
the inferences." EAGALA v. Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2007 UT App 43,

ii 16,

157 P.3d 334. This is true, even if all of the inferences Burgess seeks were
equally reasonable to those actually drawn by the CSRO - which they are
not. This Court simply does not "substitute its judgment as between two
reasonably conflicting views, even though [it] may have come to a different
conclusion had the case come before [it] for de novo review." Id.
The CSRO's findings are logically and rationally based on the evidence

\.

presented at trial, much of which was unrefuted. Airport police intervened
and Burgess was made unequivocally and painfully a ware of their concerns.
Burgess knew that the police proposed that all three - not just Summers take the cab home. Burgess voiced no opposition to this plan. Burgess
l

voluntarily got into the taxi cab. Just moments after the police left, Burgess
voluntarily and willfully got out of the cab. He then voluntarily and willfully
got into Fredrickson;s truck. He chose to do so, even despite the
"intimidating" police intervention that had just occurred. He also admitted
that, although he was aware of the risks of getting out of the cab, he did not
encourage Fredrickson to stay in the cab. These facts were stated in
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Department's Notice of Intent and in Director Cook's decision. And the
CSRO made explicit findings that these events happened.
Burgess also failed to refute Director Cook's testimony of why
termination was necessary to the best interests of the Department. This is
detailed extensively in the statement of facts, above, but included, in part:
his charge from the governor; his persistent efforts to reform the
Department's culture and restore the public trust; his opinion that a lesser
punishment that did not reflect the seriousness of the misconduct would
undermine these reforms; his making it clear Department employees would
be held to higher standard than in the past; and his perception that Burgess
was not taking full responsibility for his actions and failed to understand the
seriousness of his misconduct. Burgess conceded at trial that his job required
extra vigilance because he supervised inmates working outside the prison,
out in the community, where they posed a greater danger to the public.
Director Cook testified that he could no longer trust Burgess to do his job
adequately.
The CSRO also reasonably and rationally concluded that Burgess's
misconduct violated standards of conduct and Department policy. Burgess's
arguments on this point overlook his admission at trial that he did in fact
deserve to be disciplined for his conduct, a concession he admitted making
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more than once. R. 562. In admitting that discipline was warranted,
Burgess noted his disagreement only with the Director Cook's choice of which
discipline to impose. Id. Under Utah Admin. R. 137-1-21, CSRO's factual
determination ends once it determines that discipline is warranted, so any
dispute therewith should end with Burgess's definitive concession. See Utah
Admin. R. 137-1-21(3) (once the CSRO finds factual support for the alleged
violations, its inquiry turns to proportionality); see also Despain, 824 P.2d at
445 (same).
Additionally, Burgess's argument fails because it overlooks the express
findings in CSRO's order denying reconsideration. Burgess argues that "[t]he
CSRO decision also contains no finding or suggestion that Burgess's conduct
was dishonest" and that "the only finding in the CSRO decision (or allegation
of the Department) of wrongdoing was that Burgess exhibited poor
judgment." Aplt Brf. 25. This completely overlooks the supplemental fact
findings in CSRO's order denying reconsideration, which is the CSRO's final
agency action in this case. 2 See Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-302(i)(a); Pentskiff

Interpreting Serus. V Dep't of Health, 2013 UT App 157, ,ri110, 12, 305 P.3d

Because this order, R. 490-95, is not attached to the opening brief, it is attached as
an addendum to this brief, pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(ll)(C).

2

I..
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l.

218 (upon the filing of a request for reconsideration, the agency's original
,&

order "no longer constitutes final agency action"). Among other things, that
order contains the express finding that Burgess's actions in getting out of the
cab and into Fredrickson's truck did in fact "violate policy." R. 492, 490-95.
The CSRO clarified that only the public intoxication findings were
vacated and that all other factual allegations in the Notice of Intent were
affirmed, which included allegations that Burgess violated standards of
conduct and policy. R. 493. By way of example, in a non-exhaustive list, the
CSRO expressly noted "other policies" that Burgess violated. First, the
CSRO found that Burgess violated UDC Policy AE 02/07 because he "he was
clearly dishonest," he "was not honest in his actions when he indicated he
would take a taxi, got in the taxi, but then got out of the taxi," and he
"deceived the airport police officers by allowing them to believe he would do

.J

something and then not doing it." R. 493. And, second, the CSRO found that
Burgess violated UDC Policy AE 02/11.03 because "this incident had the
potential to bring discredit upon the Department in the public arena, and
moreover, it did bring discredit upon Grievant within the Department." R.
)

494.
In addition to policy violations, Burgess also violated standards of
conduct. Burgess glosses over this point, arguably waiving the issue. Aplt.

)
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Br. 17. The Department argued at trial that Utah Admin. R. 477-9, which
was cited in the Notice of Intent, requires, in addition to compliance with the
policies themselves, that employees also comply with the "standards of
conduct" established in the administrative rules and departmental policies.
Tr. 593-94. Violation of these "standards of conduct" was expressly listed in
the Notice of Intent as a basis for discipline, independent of department
policy violations. R. 551. As an example of how the Utah Administrative
Rules provide that employee discipline is not limited to policy violations only,
but may include other things, the Department noted that the rules provide

\.

for discipline in cases of "misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance," or for
"failure to advance the good of the public service, including conduct on or off
duty which demeans or harms the effectiveness or ability of the agency to
fulfill its mission." Tr. 594-95 (quoting language from Utah Admin. R. 47711).

And Burgess's "poor judgment" argument also fails. Aplt. Brf. 16-17.
He was not disciplined for some abstract exercise of poor judgment. Rather,
he was disciplined for his actions - actions that demonstrated poor judgment.
--- -

•- -

+. -----

··•---

•--

-

+

That he exercised poor judgment - specifically in getting out of the cab and
into Fredrickson's truck - is simply an inference that can be drawn from his
actions. The extent of airport police's intervention, and how quickly Burgess
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l

defied it, logically and reasonably support the inference, even if other
evidence, such as Burgess's self-serving testimony, might (reasonably or
otherwise) have support a different inference. Moreover, the CSRO and
Director Cook were not the only ones to draw that inference. Burgess himself
admitted to Director Cook that he "exercised poor judgment." Tr. 353.
Whether deemed to be poor judgment or something else, there was never any
question that Fredrickson's actions at the airport were the basis of his
discipline. Those actions were clearly alleged in the Notice of Intent and
expressly sustained by the CSRO as a violation of policy, as set forth above.
Considering the entire record, Burgess has not shown that the CSRO's
factual findings are "clearly" against the logic and effect" of the evidence, or
"clearly" against the "reasonable and probable deductions to be drawn" from
the evidence. Sorge, 2006 UT App 2,

il 22.

He has not shown that the

CSRO's findings were without a logical or rational basis in record. See

Murray, 2013 UT 38, ,I 32 ("[r]easonableness ... is essentially a test for logic
and completeness rather than the correctness of the decision). To the
contrary, substantial evidence supports the findings. Accordingly, this Court
.;

should affirm .

.J
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Proportionality
The CSRO was reasonable and rational in concluding that Director
Cook's decision to terminate was not an abuse of discretion. As set forth
above, Burgess stipulates that all issues in this appeal should be reviewed for
reasonableness and rationality. This is not a correctness standard:
Reasonableness is a "test for logic and completeness rather than the
correctness of the decision." Murray, 2013 UT 38, ,I 32 (emphasis added).
This Court will reverse only if the CSRO reaches an outcome 'that is clearly
against the logic and effect of such facts as are presented in support of the
application, or against the reasonable and probable deductions to be drawn
from the facts disclosed upon the hearing."' Sorge, 2006 UT App 2,

ii

22

(quoting Tolman, 818 P.2d at 26).
The CSRO, in turn, makes a limited inquiry to determine whether the
discipline imposed "is excessive, disproportionate or otherwise constitutes an
abuse of discretion." Utah Admin. R. 137-1-21(3)(b). In making this
determination, the CSRO "shall give deference to the decision of the agency."

Id. (emphasis added). The CSRO's review is limited because "discipline
·-

-

imposed for employee misconduct is within the sound discretion of the
[agency head], which will be reversed only when the punishment is clearly
disproportionate to the offense, and exceeds the bounds of reasonableness
l
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and rationality." Sorge v. Office of Attorney Gen., 2006 UT App 2,
@

if 31, 128

P.3d 566 (citing Lunnen, 886 P.2d at 73); Lucas v. Murray City Ciu. Serv.

Comm'n, 949 P.2d 746, 761 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); see also Harmon v. Ogden
City Serv. Comm'n, 2007 UT App 336, ,I 6, 171 P.3d 474 (fire chief is entitled
to deference because he is best able to balance the competing concerns in
pursuing a particular disciplinary action); In Re the Discharge of Wayne L.

Jones, 720 P.2d 1356 (Utah 1986) (sheriff must manage and direct his
deputies and is in the best position to know whether their actions merit
ltJi

discipline); Greer v. Salt Lake City Civil Serv. Comm., 2007 UT App 293, *2
(unpublished) (police chief "must have the ability to manage and direct his
officers, and is in the best position to know whether their actions merit
discipline," particularly where chief lost confidence in [employee's] ability to
conduct himself in serving the public).
This Court announced several factors to help guide the CSRO and other
tribunals in assessing proportionality:
(a) whether the violation is directly related to the employee's
official duties and significantly impedes his or her ability to carry
out those duties; (b) whether the offense was of a type that
adversely affects the public confidence in the department; (c)
whether the offense undermines the morale and effectiveness of
the department; or (d) whether the offense was committed
willfully or knowingly, rather than negligently or inadvertently.
Court's have further considered whether the misconduct is likely
to reoccur.
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Ogden City Corp. v. Harmon, 2005 UT App 274,

ii 18, 116 P.3d 973. This

Court also noted that the strength of the evidence can be considered, as well
as an employee's past service record, an employee's dishonesty, and whether
the misconduct was part of a series of violations accompanied by progressive
discipline. Id. And the Court noted that its prior case law acknowledging the
severity of the misconduct as another valid factor to consider. Id. at

,r

17.

Most of these factors militate in favor of termination. The evidence was
anything but tenuous; it was undisputed that Burgess got out of the cab and
into the truck, despite the intervention of airport police. Burgess was
dishonest when he deceived the airport officers into thinking he would take
the cab home. Director Cook considered the misconduct to be severe.
Burgess's misconduct impeded his ability to carry out his duties, inasmuch as
trust was vital to Burgess's assignment and his misconduct eviscerated the
Director's trust in him. The offense was of a type that adversely affects public
confidence in the Department, even if it did not in fact become well known
enough to have actually affected public confidence; Burgess's nonchalant
attitude toward possible drunk driving and his utter disregard for and
defiance of the airport police's intervention is certainly at odds with a top law
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enforcement priority to prevent drunk driving and protect the community
(.j

from drunk drivers.

It was logical and reasonable for Director Cook to conclude that
imposing a lesser sanction would likely be perceived by fellow employees or
the public as allowing a double standard, thereby undermining eighteen
months of work to increase public confidence in the department and morale
within the department. The "slap on the wrist" mentality was one of the very
things Director Cook was trying fix. A slap on the wrist for such serious
misconduct would have been a step backward from the new expectation of
increased employee accountability.
And Burgess's decisions to get out of the cab and into the truck were
made knowingly and willfully. Even though he tries to cloud his decision in
ignorance because he did not at the time know how high Fredrickson's blood
alcohol level was, there was abundant evidence that Burgess acted knowingly
and willfully in disregard of the airport police's intervention, as well as in
disregard of other signs of Fredrickson's impairment, and that he was aware
of the risks of leaving the cab. In addition, Director Cook was extremely
concerned that Burgess would exhibit similar poor judgment again in the
future and while on the job. And Director Cook perceived that Burgess failed
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to take full responsibility for getting out of the cab and did not appear to fully
understand the seriousness of what he did.
But, more to the point of Director Cook's discretion, Burgess has not
shown that termination was clearly outside the reasonable range of decisions
his discretion would have allowed him to make. See Tolman, 818 P.2d 23, 26
(quoting R. Aldisert, The Judicial Process 759 (1976)) ("Discretion
'encompasses the power of choice among several courses of action, each of
which is considered permissible."'). Even if, as the CSRO suggested, the
range of possible sanctions might have included both termination and a hefty
suspension, Director Cook's discretion left him "free to choose from among
this range without regard to what an appellate court thinks is the 'best'
answer." Murray, 2013 UT 38,

if 30. And considering everything Director

Cook factored into his decision, from Burgess's audacity in defying airport
police moments after they left, to how Director Cook was fulfilling the
governor's mandate, the CSRO logically and reasonably concluded that
Director Cook had not imposed a disproportionate sanction or otherwise
abused his discretion. Id. at

,r 32 (reasonableness is "essentially a
-- .

-

test for

logic and completeness rather than the correctness of the decision").
Contrary to Burgess's assertion, the Harmon decision did not hold that
a certain set of circumstances will definitively or automatically "tip the
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balance against termination." Id. To the contrary, this Court merely
~

suggested a hypothetical circumstance that "may"- but not must - tip the
balance against termination. Id. This inapposite circumstance is when an
exemplary service record is coupled with "tenuous evidence of misconduct."

Id. Harmon in no way intimates that an exemplary service record, on its
own, must outweigh all other considerations, including the seriousness of the
misconduct. If such was the case, an employee with an exemplary service
record could not be terminated for a first instance of misconduct, no matter
~

how egregious. To the contrary, Harmon sets out an employee's past
disciplinary record as one of many considerations to be considered, without
limiting an employing agency's discretion in how much weight to give each
factor. The Harmon court wisely declined to define any set of circumstances
that would definitively mandate a sanction less than termination; to do so
would have encroached on the reviewing agency's discretion by allowing one
or two factors to outweigh the rest. Here, the CSRO simply gave less weight
to Burgess's disciplinary history, noting that it might have given that history
more weight

if the facts

were significantly different: if airport police had not

intervened, not suggested and arranged for a taxi, not arrested Burgess for
individualized suspicion of public intoxication, and not arrested Fredrickson
for DUI. R. 494-95.
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Burgess's argument notwithstanding, the evidence of Burgess's
misconduct was anything but tenuous. Burgess admitted that the police
intervention at the airport occurred. He admitted that this intervention left
an impression - he was surprised and intimidated by it. This intervention
alone should have logically given Burgess pause before blindly accepting
Fredrickson's assertion of sobriety. In addition, the Department presented
additional objective evidence that should have given Burgess further pause:
the initial officer was concerned enough about any of the three men driving;
Fredrickson's arresting officer said Fredrickson had slurred speech, glossy
and red eyes, and smelled of alcohol; that officer would not have felt
comfortable with Fredrickson driving based on those signs alone, even
without knowing that Fredrickson's blood alcohol was more than twenty
percent of the legal limit; Burgess himself admitted that he had seen
Fredrickson drinking all day.
Yet, despite all of this - and especially despite the intimidating police
intervention and its impact on Burgess - Burgess chose not to question
Fredrickson's protestations of sobriety. Just moments after police left,
Burgess got out of the cab. He then got into Fredrickson's truck. He never
encouraged Fredrickson to stay in the cab or tried to dissuade him from
driving. This evidence is not tenuous, even though Burgess dislikes the
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inferences and conclusions drawn from it - both by Director Cook and then,
~

ultimately by the CSRO.
When viewed in light of Director Cook's charge to reform the
Department, the CSRO's decision was not "clearly against the logic and
effect" of the facts or "against the reasonable and probable deductions to be
drawn from the facts." Sorge, 2006 UT App 2,

,r 22 (citation omitted).

Rather, the CSRO's proportionality assessment was closely and logically tied
to the evidence. Director Cook had been working persistently for eighteen
vJ

months to fulfill his mandate. He had worked from day one to increase
departmental accountability for misconduct and made it clear that he would
hold employees to a higher standard of conduct. It was logical and
reasonable for Director Cook to give considerable weight to these
considerations.

It was equally logical for Director Cook to lose confidence in Burgess for
his insistence that blind trust in a friend was adequate justification for
disregarding and defying the intervention of multiple officers from a sister
law enforcement agency. Among the specific problems Director Cook was
trying to fix in the Department was its poor reputation among sister law
enforcement and corrections agencies.
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Burgess's remaining argument about inconsistent discipline lacks
merit. Director Cook did not consider relevant any discipline imposed by
prior administrations, nor was he required to by rule. See Utah Admin. R.
4 77-11-3 ("agency head ... need only consider those cases decided under the
administration of the current agency head"). There was no evidence of a
prior discipline during Director Cook's administration that would have
supported a claim of inconsistent treatment. The CSRO correctly noted that
the arguably closest comparable discipline - the dog bit incident - was
irrelevant because it occurred after Burgess's discipline. R. 444. The
purportedly comparable discipline involving a failure to report child abuse
was clearly distinguishable because of a lack of proof that the misconduct
occurred. Tr. 381. The other purported comparable disciplines did not even
come close to Burgess's situation. When a grievant cannot be compared to
others similarly situated, this Court examines the discipline "only in the
context of the misconduct and role and purpose of the Department." Sorge at

,r 31.

The reasonable and logical manner in which Burgess's misconduct was

CO!]-Sidered in light of the role and purpose of the Department has already
been discussed at length.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this court should uphold the CSRO decision
affirming the agency's decision to term~te Burgess's employment.
Respectfully submitted this /

/p "l:;of October, 2015.
SEAN REYES
Utah Attorney General

Assistant Utah Attorney General
Office of the Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
P.O. Box 140856
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856
Attorneys for Utah Department of
Corrections
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BEFORE THE STATE OF UTAH CAREER SERVICE REVIEW OFFICE

STEPHEN M. BURGESS,
Grievant,

RULING ON GRIEV ANT'S
AMENDED MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

v.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS,
Agency.

Case No. 2010 CSRO/H.O. 086
Hearing Officer Katherine A. Fox

Grievant filed an Amended Motion for Reconsideration on February 2, 2015, asking that the
original decision in this matter be "reversed" based on three arguments. The first basis is that the
Agency failed to provide sufficient notice to Grievant that he was being terminated because the
Executive Director could no longer trust him and therefore, the alleged insufficient notice violated
his due process rights. The second claim is that the original decision reached an erroneous conclusion
that there was substantial evidence to conclude Grievant's conduct violated "any Department
policy ... or failed to advance the good of the public service." The third argument is that terminating
Grievant for his decision to get into the truck with his friend who intended to drive while drunk is
disproportionate (an therefore, an abuse of discretion) to the offense. I will consider each of these
arguments below.

I.

INSUFFICIENT NOTICE/DUE PROCESS VIOLATION,

It has been long established that certain public employees such as Grievant have a property
interest in their jobs and that interest cannot be deprived except pursuant to constitutionally adequate
procedures. Grievant contends that he was denied due process because the notice he received did not
specify that the Executive Director no longer trusted him. A consideration of this claim must contain
.)
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a determination as to what constitutionally protected process Gricvant was entitled and only then,
an examination of whether it was duly afforded. The U.S. Supreme Court concluded in the seminal
case of Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 4 70 U.S. 532 ( 1985) that in light of balancing
several important interests, "before an employee's termination, minimum due process entitles an
employee to oral or written notice of the charges, an explanation of the employer's evidence, and an
opportunity for the employee to present his or her side of the story in 'something less than a full
evidentiary hearing"' (citations omitted).
As the Utah Supreme Court has stated, "Due process is not a technical conception with a
fixed content unrelated to time, place, and circumstances; it is flexible and requires such procedural
protections as the particular situation demands. In an analysis of a procedure, an important factor is
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of a private interest through the procedures, and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards." Worrall v. Ogden City Fire Dep 't.,
616 P.2d 598 at 602 (Utah 1980).
The CSRO and indeed, this hearing officer, has had a number of opportunities to address the
sufficiency of a termination notice as it relates to due process although not in this exact context. See,
e.g., M Dale King v. Utah Department of Human Services, 7 CSRB 70 Step 6 Decision (2003) at
29-33. Perhaps the closest example is Margo Halliday v UDHR, 17 CSRB/HO244 (1999). There,
the Grievant argued that the Notice of Intent letter she received did not specify the exact case logs
ofwhich she was alleged to have falsified, only that she had generally falsified numerous entries.
She claimed, therefore, that the Department violated her due process rights by failing to give her
proper notice of the charges against her at her preliminary administrative hearing. Specifically, she
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argued the Department failed to inform her at that particular stage of the proceedings of the specific
case logs she allegedly falsified.
The hearing office in the Halliday case wrote in his decision:
I conclude that Gricvant's due process rights were not violated. This
conclusion is reached for the following reasons: (a) While not
specifying the exact case logs that were allegedly falsified, the
"Notice of Intent to Terminate" letter given to Grievant by the
Department clearly informed her that falsification of case logs was
one of the grounds for her dismissal; (b) While copies of the exact
case logs allegedly falsified were not given to Grievant at the Step 4
Hearing, the Department discussed the issue generally with her at the
hearing and gave her an opportunity to present her side of the story;
(c) The Step 4 Hearing was conducted in such a way as to comply
with the minimal requirements of due process set forth in Utah Code
Ann.§ 67-19-18(5)(a)aswell asloudermillv. Cleveland Ed. a/Educ.
470 U.S. 532 (1985); and (d) At the prehearing conference conducted
by the CSRB Administrator, the Department gave Grievant copies of
the case logs it intended to rely on at the Step 5 Hearing. At one point
in the hearing Halliday's counsel conceded that while his client may
have received due process, it was "minimal due process" at best.

In his Amended Motion for Reconsideration, Grievant apparently fails to apprehend that a
lack of trust is not in and of itself a basis to terminate an employee, but an effect of the misconduct
that violates a rule, policy, law or regulation. The Executive Director's lack of trust in Grievant was
a consequence of Grievant's actions when he decided to get out of the taxi called by airport police
and get into his friend's truck. The Executive Director's reaction to Grievant's poor judgment may
just as well have been one of frustration, impatience or even disgust. The bottom line is that
Grievant's choices under the circumstances, which violated policy, undermined the Executive
)

Director's confidence in him. That, in turn, made the Executive Director question Grievant's
judgment and his ability to perform a job which sometimes requires split second decisions in difficult
)

)
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circumstances with a suspect population and great potential harm to the public. The Agency is not
required to enumerate a parade of horribles and every conceivable effect of an action in a termination
notice to justify its decision. In order to receive sufficient due process in this type of administrative
proceeding, Grievant was entitled to know what specific conduct was deemed problematic and what
rule, policy, regulation or law was allegedly violated. In reviewing the Intent to Dismiss, this he had.
II.

No SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT CONCLUSION THAT GRIEVANT VIOLATED
ANY RULE, POLICY, LAW OR REGULATION.

The Decision that I issued in this case clearly finds that allegations of public intoxication
were not supported by substantial evidence. Grievant may or may not have been intoxicated and it
was impossible to tell from the evidence presented. Thus, that basis has been vacated. There arc,
however, other policies that were cited in the Intent to Dismiss letter. One of those was UDC Policy
AE. 02/07. That policy requires that member of the Department conduct themselves lawfully and
honestly. Honesty is not necessarily limited to whether someone is telling the truth. For instance,
one may be dishonest by failure to disclose something or by a misleading response. Grievant was
not honest in his actions when he indicated he would take a taxi, got in the taxi, but then got out of
the taxi. Honesty encompasses such things as exhibiting integrity in a professional context and
ensuing trustworthiness. While Grievant may not have violated a law in this incident, he clearly was
dishonest even though he was not charged with lying. Grievant would be hard pressed to argue that
the taxi incident exhibited his sense of honesty and reflected his trustworthiness. Honesty also means
-

to avoid deception. Grievant deceived the airport police officers by allowing them to believe he
would do something and then not doing it.
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The other policy cited in the Intent to Dismiss letter was UDC Policy AE 02/11.03 section
P governing professionalism. In part, that section states that no member shall act or behave privately
or officially in such a manner that undennines the efficiency of the Department, or brings discredit
upon himself, the State or Utah or the Department. Certainly, this incident had the potential to bring
discredit upon the Department in the public arena, and moreover, it did bring discredit upon Grievant
and within the Department.

Ill.

THE PENAL TY OF TERMINATION WAS DISPROPORTIONATE TO GRIEVANT'S OFFENSE.

Finally, Grievant argues that his termination constituted an abuse of discretion because it was
disproportionate to his offense. This argument relies heavily on the analytical prong that Grievant
had a blemish-free work history. However, an employee's work record is just one among many
factors that an Agency head may consider when assessing discipline.

Moreover, it is not a

controlling factor. Grievant also claims that Grievant's offense was not that serious, especially when
compared to other employee misconduct which warranted termination other cases. This claim, even
if true, however, is an insufficient basis upon which to conclude that an abuse of discretion occurred.
An analogy might be that even though an employee did not assault her supervisor, she still can be

terminated for committing petty theft. Grievant then argues that he had defensible reasons for his
actions, e.g., he did not believe that his long-time friend was legally intoxicated and should not be
driving. Thus, the argument continues, there is no substantial evidence to support his termination.

This might be a stronger argument if the airport police had not been involved and: (I) told
the men to take a taxi -which they then arranged for; (2) they had not arrested Grievant for suspicion
of public intoxication; and (3) had Frederickson, the driver, not been arrested and later convicted
.)
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of DUI. It is the very beliefs that Grievant held and acted upon - that everything was A-OK- that
led him to do what he did. Even Grievant admitted in his appeal letter to the Executive Director that,
"I know my actions that night were ultimately the wrong ones - I made a very big mistake by getting
out of the cab with the other two passengers." Although Grievant did not intend to engage in
misconduct he is still accountable for what he did.
The standard of abuse of discretion is a high one and extremely difficult to meet. The facts
of this case and applicable law as outlined in the original decision reflect why this standard has not
been met. Although I would not have made the decision that the Executive Director made in this
case, and instead imposed a hefty suspension, a hearing officer cannot substitute his or her judgment
after an Agency has acted if the applicable criteria are met.
DATED this 12111 day of February, 2015.
~{2-~
KATHERINE A. F

X

CSRO Presiding Hearing Officer

JUDICIAL REVIEW
A party may petition for judicial review of this formal adjudication and final agency action pursuant to Utah Adm in.
Code R 13 7-1-21 (J 3)(14), and Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-40/ and 403, Utah Administrative Procedures Act.
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